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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this Court is not in issue. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This case presents one novel issue under Utah law: should 
alimony be terminated where the ex-wife has received alimony for 
22 years, is a self-sufficient professional, but the ex-husband has 
the means to continue paying alimony? Specifically, four issues 
are presented for review: 
(1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding 
a change in plaintiff's circumstances and in terminating her 
alimony after 22 years? 
(2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
the plaintiff's petition for increased alimony? 
(3) Did the trial court consider the plaintiff's needs, 
her earning capacity and the defendant's ability to pay 
alimony in arriving at its decision to terminate alimony? and, 
(4) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing 
to expand discovery of defendant's financial records where the 
defendant had provided tax returns and financial statements 
and had stipulated that he had the ability to continue to pay 
alimony? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
This is a case in equity, and no statutes or rules are 
directly determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a judgment and order modifying a 
divorce decree. 
B. Proceedings and Disposition 
On October 16, 1986 the defendant husband petitioned the Third 
Judicial District Court, Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, for modification 
of the Decree of Divorce originally entered in 1965, Record page 
5, (hereinafter "R."), by eliminating his alimony obligation. R. 
19-22. The plaintiff answered and cross-petitioned for an order 
increasing alimony. R. 61-69. The defendant thereafter moved for 
summary judgment on plaintiff's second claim for relief, which 
alleged fraud on the part of the defendant at the time of the 
original decree more than 20 years ago. The defendant also moved 
for summary judgment on the plaintiff's fourth claim for relief, 
in which the plaintiff contended that she was entitled to 
compensation based on the Masters of Business Administration degree 
conferred upon the defendant during the marriage of the parties. 
R. 81-85. By Order dated May 18, 1987 the Court granted 
defendant's motion for summary judgment in defendant's favor as to 
plaintiff's fraud claims1 and as to plaintiff's claims that she was 
entitled to a portion of defendant's income resulting from 
defendant's M.B.A. degree. R. 158. The plaintiff also moved for 
1Plaintiff does not appeal from the summary judgment entered 
against her claims of fraud. Docketing Statement 4-5. 
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summary judgment, requesting that the husband's petition for 
modification be dismissed on the grounds that plaintiff had a 
continuing need for alimony. Plaintiff's motion was denied. R. 
157, 162-63, 248. 
Simultaneously with granting partial summary judgment for 
defendant, the Court also sustained the defendant's objections to 
plaintiff's discovery on the basis that such requests were onerous 
and oppressive, in light of the defendant's production of federal 
tax returns, financial statements and his stipulation that he was 
financially able to pay any reasonable alimony award. R. 88, 159, 
201-205. 
Trial was held on January 15, 1988. R. 249. On January 20, 
1988 the Court orally announced its decision granting the 
defendant's petition to terminate alimony and denying the 
plaintiff's petition to increase alimony. R. 250. After 
considering and granting in part some of the plaintiff's objections 
to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 
on February 29, 1988 entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment and Order terminating alimony. R. 220-233, 247 
at 25. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied by the Court. 
R. 225-237, 247. On March 18, 1988 the plaintiff filed a notice 
of appeal. R. 239. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The relevant facts are not greatly in dispute. William 
Bridenbaugh, defendant, and Edrie A. Bridenbaugh, plaintiff, were 
married on February 2, 1956. R. 12. At that time, both parties 
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had a bachelor's degree. The parties were divorced on December 8, 
1965 after less than 10 years of marriage. R. 12. It appears from 
the record that the net worth of the plaintiff resulting from the 
Decree of Divorce consisted of a promissory note in the amount of 
$9,772.00 together with 50 shares of Boise Cascade stock and some 
insurance policies. R. 6-9. This net worth was nominal compared 
to plaintiff's present net worth of $221, 000.00. The Decree and 
Property Settlement Agreement dated December 2, 1965 and executed 
by the parties and adopted by the Court, directed the defendant to 
make child support payments until the parties' two daughters 
reached the age of 21. R. 9, 13. Both daughters are now older 
than 21 and are financially independent. R. 249 at 26. The Decree 
also ordered the defendant to make alimony payments of $400.00 per 
month to the plaintiff "until changed by law or order of this 
Court." R. 13. Defendant fully and faithfully complied with the 
terms of the Decree by paying all required alimony and child 
support payments. R. 249 at 53-54. In addition, he, assisted one 
daughter who elected to attend college. R. 249 at 13. 
As would be expected, both parties have experienced 
substantial changes in their lives since their divorce 23 years 
ago. Immediately prior to the divorce the plaintiff was not 
employed outside the home and she had no income. R. 249 at 15. 
At the time of the divorce, she was raising two small children R. 
249 at 12-15. 
The plaintiff did not, immediately following entry of the 
judgment and decree of divorce, obtain employment. R. 249 at 15. 
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Rather, she returned to the University of Utah and obtained a 
masters degree in social work in 1969. R. 249 at 15-16. She 
commenced working outside the home in 1969 and was employed by the 
Granite School District in 1974--some 14 years ago—where she still 
works in the field of her education. R. 249 at 15-18. 
Since the divorce in 1965, plaintiff's overall financial 
situation changed from that of a housewife with a B.S. degree and 
young children, unemployed outside the home, R. 249 at 15, to an 
economically independent, full-time professional student counselor 
with a masters degree who has been employed by the Granite School 
District for more than 14 years. 
In 1987 plaintiff had a gross income from her part-time 
employment of approximately $15,762. R. 249 at 19-20. Her 15-year 
tenure with the School District entitles her to retirement 
benefits. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, R. 249 at 47. She owns a 
condominium and a mountain resort home, an automobile, and stocks. 
She testified at trial that her net worth was approximately 
$221,000. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. R. 249 at 24. 
Defendant remarried after the divorce and is the father of 
twin daughters by his second marriage. R. 129, 249 at 54. The 
defendant has advanced steadily in the business world since the 
divorce. His income and net worth are substantially more than they 
were in 1965. R. 249 at 54-55. Defendant testified that his base 
salary for 1986 was $240,000 and that his income for the calendar 
year 1986 is eight times greater than his income during the 
calendar year in which the Judgment and Decree of Divorce was 
5 
entered (1965). He also acknowledged that his net worth in 1986 
($2,908,400) was approximately 44 times greater than his net worth 
in 1965. R. 249 at 55, 70-71, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. The 
defendant in his pleadings and during all proceedings acknowledged 
that his application for elimination of alimony was not based on 
his circumstances but upon the change in the plaintiff's 
circumstances. R. 20, 249 at 3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff's circumstances changed substantially after the 
parties divorced 22 years ago. Her acquisition of a masters 
degree, stable employment and an increase in her net worth of more 
than $200,000 are changes that clearly justify modification of the 
divorce decree. 
Alimony should not be an annuity. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by terminating alimony after 22 years, even 
though the defendant had the means to continue paying alimony. 
The trial court properly considered all the relevant factors 
in deciding to terminate alimony. Finally, the trial court 
properly denied the plaintiff's unnecessary and burdensome pretrial 
discovery. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is an important preliminary 
consideration for this Court. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
An award of alimony, or modification thereof, 
is within the sound discretion of the Court, 
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings of the Court, or there has been a 
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misapplication of the law, or the Court has 
clearly abused its discretion. 
Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147, 149 (Utah 1979) [citations omitted]. 
A more recent case held: 
While we may review both the facts and the law 
in matters of equity, we also accord 
considerable deference to the judgment of the 
trial court and treat its findings with a 
presumption of validity. 
King v. King, 717 P. 2d 715-16 (Utah 1986). Applying those 
standards to the facts of this case mandates affirmance of the 
Judgment and Order of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN FINDING A CHANGE IN THE PLAINTIFF'S CIRCUMSTANCES 
AND IN MODIFYING THE DECREE BY TERMINATING ALIMONY. 
A. Change in Circumstances 
The plaintiff contends that there was insufficient evidence 
to support the Court's finding of a change of plaintiff's 
circumstances justifying a modification of the divorce decree. 
(Brief of the Appellant, hereinafter "Brief", pages 12-16). 
Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, ample evidence shows that a 
substantial change in plaintiff's circumstances had taken place 
since the divorce, justifying modification of the divorce decree. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that financial 
change affecting either spouse is an appropriate reason to modify 
a divorce decree. Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P. 2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982); 
Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984); King v. King, 27 
7 
Utah 2d 303, 495 P.2d 823 (1972). In Haslam v. Haslam, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
With respect to modifying alimony, this 
Court has recently stated that 'provisions in 
the original decree of divorce granting 
alimony, child support, and the like must be 
readily susceptible to alteration at a later 
date, as the need which such provisions were 
designed to fill are subject to rapid and 
unpredictable change.' Foulger v. Foulger, 
Utah, 626 P.2d 412 (1981). 
On the instant facts it is clear that 
there has been a substantial change of 
circumstances. Since the divorce, the former 
Mrs. Haslam has obtained employment, 
experienced a substantial increase in income 
and has accumulated some savings. 
657 P.2d at 758. 
Similarly, in Jeppson v. Jeppson, the Supreme Court upheld a 
trial court's finding of change in circumstances, stating: 
A relative change in the income and expenses 
of the parties, if comparatively 
significant, can amount to a substantial 
change in circumstances. 
648 P.2d at 70. 
Plaintiff quotes Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P. 2d 707, 710 (Utah 
1985), arguing that defendant failed to carry his burden of showing 
a substantial change of plaintiff's circumstances justifying a 
modification of the divorce decree. (Brief, 12). Actually, Naylor 
held that a change in income and the increased age of the parties' 
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children was sufficient reason to modify a divorce decree. 700 
P.2d at 710.2 
Here, the plaintiff's earnings and the substantial increase 
in her net worth clearly constitute a change in her circumstances 
justifying modification of the 1965 decree. At the time of the 
entry of the decree, the plaintiff had no significant assets or net 
worth and no earnings. She was not employed outside the home and 
was raising two small children. At this time she is a highly 
educated, self-sufficient, employed professional with an advanced 
degree, a good professional income, a net worth of approximately 
$221,000 and supporting no dependent children. Such economic 
improvements easily fall within the Utah standards for substantial 
change of circumstances permitting modification of a divorce 
decree. It is irrational for the plaintiff to argue that no 
substantial changes have occurred in her circumstances over the 
past 22 years. 
Plaintiff's contention that the Decree was not susceptible to 
modification is fallacious. (Brief, 18). The Decree specifically 
states that alimony was to be paid "until changed . . . by order 
of this Court." R. 13. 
2Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) is also cited by 
the plaintiff in support of her argument that the trial court's 
order was erroneous. (Brief, 12). Jones was not a modification 
of a divorce decree, and is irrelevant to the change in 
circumstances issue. 
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B. The Purpose of Alimony 
The issue of first impression for this Court is whether the 
purposes of alimony have been fulfilled here by the defendant's 
faithful payment of alimony for 22 years. The defendant 
acknowledges that his income and net worth are such that he could 
have continued paying to the plaintiff $400.00 or more per month 
as alimony. Defendant petitioned to terminate his alimony 
obligations not because of financial hardship upon him, but because 
it is simply inequitable to require an ex-husband to continue 
paying alimony for more than 22 years to an ex-wife who has a 
masters degree, who is and has been professionally employed for 15 
years, and whose lifestyle is now much higher than the lifestyle 
she enjoyed during the marriage and at the time of the divorce. 
The purpose of alimony is, of course, at the heart of this 
appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
The purpose of alimony is to enable the spouse who 
receives alimony to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living that was enjoyed during the marriage. 
Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984). The Supreme Court 
has further held: 
the purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife 
and not to inflict punitive damages on the husband. 
Alimony is not intended as a penalty against the husband 
nor a reward to the wife.... 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977) (quoting 2 Nelson 
Divorce and Annulment); see also Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 84 
(Utah App. 1987). A key function of alimony is "to prevent the 
wife from becoming a public charge." English v. English, 565 P.2d 
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at 411 (Utah 1977). Finally, the Utah courts have held that public 
policy should encourage one receiving alimony to seek employment. 
Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904, 905 (Utah 1978). 
C. Alimony Is Not An Annuity. 
Several Utah cases have held that -armination or reduction of 
alimony is appropriate where the wife3 is economically able to 
satisfy her needs. In Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976), the 
Supreme Court reversed a trial courtf s refusal to reduce alimony 
from $300 per month to $1.00 per year. The former wife in Dehm, 
like the plaintiff here, obtained a masters degree after entry of 
the decree of divorce and secured gainful employment. Id. at 528. 
She also acquired equities and savings in the amount of $11,500. 
The court held: 
although an increase in the income of a 
divorced wife does not, of itself, determine 
a reduction in alimony; neither does an 
increase in the income of a divorced husband, 
of itself, determine the maintenance of 
alimony. 
* * * 
In a situation such as this, where the 
defendant [wife] is gainfully employed, making 
a salary sufficient to satisfy her needs, is 
adequately housed, and is in good health; one 
of the functions of alimony is not to provide 
retirement income. We do not want to confuse 
alimony with annuity. 
apparently, Utah does not have an appellate case involving 
alimony awarded to a husband. 
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Id. at 528-29. [Emphasis added] Dehm parallels the facts here and 
is controlling. 
Defendant's alimony payments assisted the plaintiff to obtain 
a masters degree that qualified the plaintiff for the professional 
field in which she has worked since 1969. R. 15. The plaintiff, 
as did the wife in Dehm, has achieved economic self-sufficiency 
through her labor in graduate school and in the working world. She 
has been employed by the same employer for 15 years and has no 
dependent children to support. She has net worth of $221,000. Her 
claims for continued alimony are premised on her ex-husband's post-
divorce financial success and ability to pay, and not upon her own 
economic need. To maintain defendant's alimony obligations beyond 
22 years would be bestowing an annuity (until death) upon the 
plaintiff—contrary to the holding in Dehm. 
In Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984), the Supreme 
Court affirmed the termination of alimony eight years after the 
dissolution of marriage which had lasted ten years. In Jeppson, 
the wife was a college graduate who had worked as a legal secretary 
and had various capital assets, including stocks and an income-
producing rental property. In affirming the termination of 
alimony, the Supreme Court focused on the wife's economic situation 
and held: 
Even though Mrs. Jeppson's illness may prevent 
her from achieving her highest earning 
capacity, the trial court concluded that her 
ability to perform some work, plus the assets 
she has available to her, are sufficient for 
her to support herself and that she is not in 
danger of becoming a financial burden to the 
12 
public. On these facts, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion. 
Id. at 71. See also, King v. King, 495 P.2d 823 (Utah 1972) 
(termination of alimony proper where wife's health improved, 
allowing her to work). 
Plaintiff cites Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978) 
(Brief, 15), arguing that terminating alimony would penalize the 
plaintiff for her industriousness. The parties in Carter were 
divorced after 31 years of marriage, and the wife was 58 years old 
when she reentered the labor force. Those facts are far different 
than these, where the wife was 32 at the time of the divorce, and 
within four years went to work after first obtaining a graduate 
degree. 
Plaintiff also cites Frank v. Frank, 585 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978) 
(Brief, 15), arguing that even if a wife is able to support 
herself, alimony should continue if the husband has sufficient 
resources to pay alimony. Frank is easily distinguishable from 
this case; first, because the parties in Frank had been married for 
21 years; second, the husband in Frank was psychologically disabled 
at the time of entry of the divorce, and although Frank is a 
modification case, it really involved the initial imposition of 
alimony after the husband had regained his health. Id. at 454. 
Plaintiff also cites Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah 
App. 1988) (Brief, 17), arguing that disparity in income mandates 
the maintenance of alimony. Rasband was an appeal from an initial 
divorce decree, not the modification of a decree. In Rasband, 
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unlike here, the parties had been married for 30 years at the date 
of divorce, and the wife had devoted herself for those 30 years to 
child rearing and not income-producing work. Id. at 1333. The ex-
wife in Rasband had "no income," in contrast to the plaintiff's 
situation here where she has had stable employment plus interest 
and dividend income, and was married for nine years—not 30. 
Plaintiff cites no case approaching these facts where the 
marriage was of short duration, the ex-wife holds a graduate 
degree, has had stable employment for fifteen years, and has 
received alimony for 22 years. Dehm, Jeppson, and King are much 
closer factually, and all support the trial court's Judgment and 
Order. 
Other jurisdictions have held that an ex-husband is not a 
"life-long guarantor" of the ex-wife's standard of living. Ward 
v. Ward, 41 Or.App. 447, 599 P.2d 1150, 1153 (1979); Anderson v. 
Anderson, 333 So.2d 484 (Fla.App. 1976) (alimony terminated even 
though husband's income substantially more than ex-wife's income); 
Lasota v. Lasota, 125 111. App. 3d. 37, 465 N.E.2d 649 (1984). 
In addition to the precedent that supports the trial court's 
judgment and order, public policy also favors an end to alimony 
under these facts. This is not a case where the wife worked her 
husband through graduate school, only to be abandoned at the 
graduation ceremony with neither a degree nor the income resulting 
from the degree. Nor is this a case where the parties were 
divorced after a lengthy marriage and the wife compelled to start 
14 
a career late in life after devoting herself to rearing children 
to adulthood. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR INCREASED ALIMONY. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by not increasing alimony or awarding equitable restitution to 
compensate her for the sacrifices she made for the defendant while 
he obtained his Master's of Business Administration degree more 
than 30 years ago and prior to the entry of the decree of divorce 
in this case. (Brief, 26-28), R. 127-28. Plaintiff cites Martinez 
v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988) (Brief, 26) as authority 
for her position. 
The trial court granted defendantf s motion for partial summary 
judgment on this issue. R. 152. Even viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, as this Court must on review 
of grant of summary judgment, Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 
(Utah App. 1987), plaintiff's claims to defendant's MBA are without 
merit. 
Martinez held that equitable restitution is appropriate 
where divorce occurs shortly after the degree 
is obtained [and] traditional alimony analysis 
would often work hardship because, while both 
spouses have modest incomes at the time of 
divorce, the one is on the threshold of a 
significant increase in earnings. 
754 P.2d at 76 quoting Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 242 
(Utah App. 1987). The Martinez court further stated that: 
The function of equitable restitution is to 
share newly obtained earning capacity of a 
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former spouse who has achieved that capacity 
through the significant efforts and sacrifices 
of the requesting spouse which were 
detrimental to that spouse's development. 
754 P.2d at 78. 
In Martinez, the husband graduated from medical school and 
began a low-paying internship in 1981, and the divoirce complaint 
was filed in 1983. 754 P.2d at 71. Here, by contrast, the 
defendant graduated from business school in 1958 and the divorce 
was filed in 1965. R. 127-28; 17. Mrs. Bridenbaugh enjoyed the 
fruits of her ex-spousefs advanced degree for seven years prior to 
divorce and for 22 years since the divorce. Mr. Bridenbaugh's 
graduate degree took two years to complete, not four years plus an 
internship, as with the husband's degree in Martinez. Further, 
Martinez and its forebearers, Petersen, supra, Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), and Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 
(Utah App. 1987) were appeals of initial decrees of divorce, unlike 
this case where the spouse has already received alimony for almost 
half of her life and where the wife has herself obtained an 
advanced degree. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED 
THE PLAINTIFF'S NEEDS, HER EARNING CAPACITY, AND THE 
DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO PAY ALIMONY. 
Much of the plaintiff's brief is devoted to challenging the 
trial court's consideration of the plaintiff's need for alimony, 
her earning capacity, and the defendant's ability to pay alimony. 
(Brief, Points B, C, D). 
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Plaintiff complains that the Court erred in discounting 
plaintiff's claimed expenses in determining her financial needs. 
(Brief, 19). Here, the trial court explicitly found that the 
plaintiff's claims of monthly expenses for house maintenance, auto 
depreciation and furniture repair were not supported by any 
evidence. R. 229, paragraph 15; R. 247 at 6. Plaintiff testified 
at trial that her costs for furniture repair and replacement were 
$269.00 per month. R. 249 at 51-52. She also testified that her 
automobile depreciated at a rate of $2,000.00 per year and that she 
had house maintenance expenses of $112.50 per month. The trial 
judge has the duty to assess the demeanor and credibility of 
witnesses, and here, the plaintiff's statements about her financial 
needs were suspect. The trial court was within its discretion in 
disregarding her testimony. Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 431 
P.2d 802, 803 (1967); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290, 
293 (1962), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962). 
Plaintiff and defendant elicited ample evidence concerning the 
plaintiff's income and her financial needs through direct and 
cross-examination. R. 249 at 11-48. Plaintiff's evidence 
concerning her financial needs was not credible, Findings of Fact 
paragraph 15, R. 229; 247 at 6, but that does not mean that the 
Court did not consider her needs in finding that alimony was no 
longer necessary. The evidence showed that the plaintiff had 
professional employment and earnings, substantial assets, including 
equity in a condominium, a resort cabin, stocks, money market funds 
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and personal property. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. The Court 
considered plaintiff's needs in coming to its decision. 
The plaintiff's earning capacity and employment history were 
also considered by the Court after substantial evidence in the 
record. R. 228; 249 at 18, 40. 
Plaintiff's assertions that the trial court did not adequately 
consider the defendant's income and assets in terminating alimony 
and in denying an alimony increase are without basis. Defendant 
did not deny that he had the income and assets to continue paying 
alimony or to pay an increase in alimony, R. 88, 249 at 66, and 
plaintiff spent much of trial in overkilling a point that was not 
disputed. R. 249 at 64-105. The trial court's statement that the 
defendant's income was sufficient to allow him to pay any increase 
in alimony indicates anything but a lack of consideration by the 
Court of the defendant's ability to pay alimony. R. 249 at 66. 
Simply because the trial court discouraged plaintiff's attempt to 
introduce cumulative evidence does not mean the Court did not fully 
consider defendant's ability to pay alimony. In Matter of the 
Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982), the court stated: 
Counsel for the respondent stipulated that 
Ruth had those financial resources [to pay off 
a mortgage] and the judge in his summation of 
the evidence at the conclusion of the trial 
stated that he assumed that Ruth had enough 
money to make those purchases on her own. In 
light of the respondent's stipulation, the 
trial court was properly within its discretion 
in refusing to admit cumulative evidence. 
655 P.2d at 1117. The defendant's ability to pay alimony was not 
an issue that required extensive evidence. Plaintiff's 
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claims that the Court failed to consider the three factors outlined 
in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), (Brief 12, 15-21, 24-
26), is without substance. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY REFUSING TO ORDER UNNECESSARY DISCOVERY 
OF THE DEFENDANT'S FINANCES. 
The Plaintiff appeals the trial court's limitations on his 
requests for discovery of defendant's economic situation. (Brief, 
21-23). However, the trial court's refusal to permit the plaintiff 
to go on a fishing trip through the defendant' s records was 
proper.4 The defendant produced tax returns and financial 
statements and readily admitted that his financial resources would 
enable him to continue paying alimony and, in fact, to pay any 
reasonable increase in alimony that the court might order. R. 20, 
88, 249 at 72-93. Therefore, defendant's admission negated the 
need for detailed discovery of the plaintiff's financial situation. 
The trial court was certainly within its discretion to 
determine that additional discovery was cumulative and 
unnecessary based on the defendant's admission. In State Road 
Commission v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 381, 412 P.2d 914, 918 (1966) the 
court stated: 
4
 Trial courts enjoy great discretion in handling pretrial 
discovery, and their discovery orders are reversed only on a 
clear showing of abuse of discretion. See e.g., United 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1382 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Judge Scalia writing for the Court). 
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The use of discovery should not be extended to 
permit ferreting unduly into detail....nor 
should it be distorted into a ' fishing 
expedition1 in hope that something should be 
uncovered. It should be confined in the 
proper limits of enabling the parties to find 
out essential facts for its legitimate 
objective.... 
In any event, the defendant produced a financial statement and tax 
returns for the last two years which reasonably fulfilled the 
plaintiff's legitimate discovery needs. R. 201, 203-205. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision to terminate defendant's alimony 
obligation was not erroneous, and should be affirmed by this Court. 
The plaintiff has had 22 years since the divorce to regain her 
footing. Her advanced degree and stable professional employment 
demonstrate that she has the means to provide for herself. 
Maintenance of alimony here would bestow an annuity on the 
plaintiff simply because her ex-husband has the ability to pay. 
The trial court's rulings on compensation for defen- dant's 
professional degree, an increase in alimony, and 
discovery issues were not abuses of discretion and should be 
upheld. A 
Respectfully submitted this / \Q day of September, 1988. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
(Jaines PM Cowley 
William H. Christensen 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
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